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The Contradiction Between Alien Tort Statute 
Jurisprudence and the Continued Immunity of 
U.S. Officials for Acts of Torture Committed 
Abroad 
 
JULES LOBEL
†
 
 
 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
1
 raised the critical question 
of the extraterritorial application of fundamental human rights norms 
when aliens sue those responsible for their torture or other abuses 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
2
 For three decades, starting with 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala
3
 in 1980, U.S. courts have relied on the 
jurisdiction afforded by that statute to hold individuals or 
corporations liable for human rights abuses committed against aliens 
abroad. Indeed, in 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the cautious use 
of the ATS to provide a remedy for aliens who were subjected to 
torture abroad.
4
 While the Supreme Court in Kiobel significantly 
narrowed the scope of ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction, as will be 
discussed in the Postscript to this Essay, U.S. courts still will assert 
jurisdiction against foreign state officials who commit torture or 
summary execution against aliens or citizens abroad under the 
 
† The author is the Bessie McKee Walthour Chaired Professor of Law at the University of 
Pittsburgh Law School, and President of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR). 
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). After hearing argument on questions of whether 
corporations could be held sued under the ATS on February 28, 2012, the Supreme Court 
ordered briefing and reargument on March 5, 2012 on the question: ―Whether and under 
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a 
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
sovereign other than the United States.‖ Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 
1738 (2012) (mem.).  
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  
4. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (―The position we take today 
has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala . . . .‖). 
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Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA),
5
 and potentially still have 
ATS jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that U.S. corporations or some 
foreign officials committed human rights abuses against aliens in 
another country. 
Yet, in sharp contrast to the ATS line of cases, U.S. courts have 
refused to adjudicate claims by citizens or aliens that U.S. officials 
have been responsible for their torture or other abuses committed 
abroad. Often, these courts have held that the U.S. Constitution's 
prohibition on torture does not apply extraterritorially.
6
 Even after the 
Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush,7 holding 
that aliens detained by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay had a 
right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal courts,
8
 the D.C. 
Circuit has still opined that other fundamental provisions of the 
Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause or the Eighth 
Amendment‘s prohibition against torture, still do not apply 
extraterritorially.
9
 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has held that even an 
alien‘s right to challenge his allegedly unlawful prolonged detention 
by seeking a writ of habeas corpus does not apply to aliens held 
extraterritorially in Afghanistan.
10
 In addition, numerous courts have 
relied on various jurisdictional and technical doctrines such as the 
Westfall Act, the special factors exception to Bivens claims, and 
qualified immunity to refuse to adjudicate aliens‘ claims that they 
have been tortured or otherwise abused by U.S. officials in the 
context of the ―war against terror.‖11 Furthermore, there has been 
dispute within the courts as to whether the international laws of war 
should be applied by the courts against Executive conduct in the 
armed conflict against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
12
 
 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).  
6. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 555 
U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Harbury v. Deutch, 233 
F.3d 596, 602–04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury, 
536 U.S. 403 (2002).  
7. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
8. Id. at 795. 
9. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529. 
10. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
11. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 769, 771, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 
2008), vacated and superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
12. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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This Essay will argue that human rights jus cogens norms, such 
as the prohibition against torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, 
and prolonged arbitrary detention, must be applied by U.S. courts to 
hold U.S. officials accountable for abuses they commit. These norms 
generally give rise to universal jurisdiction and are universally 
recognized by international society.
13
 While not every provision of 
the U.S. Constitution may be applicable to U.S. conduct abroad, 
certainly those that reflect the fundamental, universal values of 
international society ought to be binding on U.S. officials wherever 
and whenever they act, and actionable in U.S. courts. 
I. FILÁRTIGA, KIOBEL, AND LAWSUITS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS FOR 
TORTURE COMMITTED AGAINST ALIENS 
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
spawned a new era of human rights litigation in accepting the Center 
for Constitutional Rights‘ argument that a two-hundred-year-old 
statute, the ATS, could provide federal court jurisdiction and a cause 
of action for suits against foreign government officials who commit 
torture against aliens abroad.
14
 In allowing Filártiga to litigate his 
claims in federal court, the Second Circuit held that ―for purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader 
before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.‖15 The 
court believed that ―giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted 
by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment 
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.‖16 By 
providing that a foreign governmental official who tortured someone 
in another country could be held accountable in U.S. courts, the court 
was aiding the enforcement of human rights principles that all 
governments, including our own, had agreed to abide by. 
While a few judges, such as Robert Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic,
17
 questioned Filártiga‘s holding, the courts of appeals 
were virtually unanimous in following Filártiga and allowing aliens 
to sue foreign government officials who committed torture or other 
 
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 404 (1987) (―A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain 
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern . . . .‖). 
14. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
15. Id. at 890. 
16. Id. 
17. 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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violations of fundamental human rights norms abroad.
18
 Even former 
Prime Ministers were not accorded immunity from suit, with the 
Supreme Court rejecting the argument made by the former Prime 
Minister of Somalia that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
accorded him immunity from an ATS claim for his official acts 
committed on behalf of the Somalian government in Samantar v. 
Yousuf.
19
 On remand, the Fourth Circuit rejected the former official‘s 
claim that common law immunity protected him from liability for his 
official government conduct. The Fourth Circuit held that because the 
allegations of the complaint alleged violations of fundamental human 
rights norms, known as jus cogens norms, including torture, 
extrajudicial killing, and prolonged arbitrary imprisonment of 
politically and ethnically disfavored groups, official immunity was 
not available.
20
 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit recognized that both 
international and U.S. courts have increasingly concluded that ―jus 
cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and therefore do not 
merit foreign official immunity.‖21 Moreover, in 1991, Congress 
explicitly affirmed Filártiga by enacting the TVPA, which authorizes 
a civil cause of action brought by either U.S. citizens or aliens against 
any individual who ―under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture . . . or 
extrajudicial killing.‖22 
Nonetheless, U.S. government officials who have committed 
torture or other jus cogens violations against aliens abroad have been 
shielded from accountability in U.S. courts despite the Filártiga line 
of cases. The second ATS case, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
23
 
brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights after Filártiga began 
 
18. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
claim involving government-sponsored ―torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment‖ could be brought under the ATS); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 
1995) (holding that acts of foreign officials involving ―genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity‖ fall under the ATS).  
19. 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010). 
20. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit did 
recognize that head of state immunity, as opposed to official immunity, was absolute, at least 
with respect to current heads of state. Id. at 776. Other courts have also accorded immunity 
to heads of state or even former heads of state. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 
205, 221 (2d Cir. 2004); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2004). 
21. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 776. 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 
(2004) (describing the TVPA as supplementing the Filártiga decision). 
23. 770 F.2d. 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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the trend. In Sanchez-Espinoza, Nicaraguan citizens brought a suit 
against current and former Reagan Administration officials as well as 
Nicaraguan contra organizations and individuals under the ATS and 
the Constitution alleging that these officials had aided the contras in 
summarily executing and torturing civilians in Nicaragua.
24
 The D.C. 
Circuit, in an opinion written by then Judge Scalia, and joined in by 
then Judge Ginsburg, held that the ATS claim had to be dismissed on 
the basis of immunity because it ―would make a mockery of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal courts were authorized to 
sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally against present or former 
Executive officers, actions that are, concededly and as a 
jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the United States.‖25 
Thus, under this decision, U.S. officials cannot be sued under the 
ATS for official acts they committed which violate fundamental jus 
cogens human rights norms such as torture or summary execution, 
despite the fact that foreign officials have no such immunity from suit 
for the same acts.
26
 The following hypothetical provides a stark 
example of the contradiction. Assume that a foreign government 
official and a high U.S. official enter into a conspiracy to torture an 
alien in a foreign country, and that in both countries the official 
actions, although secret, are taken on behalf of the government as 
official policy. The alien at some point gets released and his torture 
ends. If the foreign government official was to come to the United 
States, the alien could sue him under either the ATS or the TVPA in 
U.S. courts. However, the U.S. official would be accorded immunity. 
That result seems to make no sense—why should U.S. courts have 
jurisdiction over official acts of a foreign government official, but not 
over the same acts committed by a U.S. official? Unfortunately, as I 
discuss below, this scenario is not hypothetical, but illustrates the 
claims of a real plaintiff who alleged this was exactly what happened 
to him. 
II. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TORTURE IN U.S. COURTS IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM 
Since 2001, various alien plaintiffs have brought lawsuits 
seeking damages in U.S. courts alleging that U.S. officials subjected 
 
24. Id. at 205. 
25. Id. at 207. 
26. Professor David Cole wrote about this contradiction in a prescient law review article 
right after the Sanchez-Espinoza case was decided. See David Cole, Challenging Covert 
War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT‘L L. J. 155 (1985). 
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them to torture abroad. None have succeeded. While the courts have 
utilized a variety of doctrines to dismiss these claims, the one stark 
and consistent holding has been that U.S. officials will not be held 
accountable in U.S. courts for claims of torture. These rulings 
contrast sharply with Filártiga. 
A. The Arar Case and Extraordinary Rendition 
Perhaps the case that raises the most vivid example of the federal 
courts‘ refusal to address claims that U.S. officials sanctioned torture 
is Arar v. Ashcroft.
27
 Arar, a Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, was 
transferring planes at Kennedy Airport in New York when he was 
detained by INS agents based on a tip from the Canadian police that 
he was a member of al-Qaeda.
28
 Questioned repeatedly by the FBI, 
Arar denied the allegations.
29
 After two weeks of solitary 
confinement in Brooklyn, INS officials, with the approval of then 
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, secretly rendered Arar to Syria, 
where he was tortured and locked in a damp, cold, underground cell 
that Arar termed a ―grave‖ cell measuring three feet wide, six feet 
long and seven feet high.
30
 After a year in detention, Syria released 
him, concluding that Arar had no connection to terrorism, and he 
returned home to Canada.
31
 To this day, Arar suffers severely from 
his ordeal. 
In 2004, Canada convened a commission to conduct an official 
inquiry into the Arar affair.
32
 In September 2006, the commission 
issued a voluminous report fully exonerating Arar of any connection 
to al-Qaeda or any terrorist group.
33
 The Canadian government 
accepted the commission‘s recommendation and officially apologized 
to Arar and paid him $11.5 million Canadian dollars as compensation 
for the Canada‘s role in his ordeal.34 
 
27. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
28. Id. at 563. 
29. Id. at 565. 
30. See id. at 565–66. 
31. See id. at 566–67. 
32. 1 COMM‘N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER 
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND (2006), 
available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv1-eng.pdf. 
33. See id. at 59. 
34. Ian Auster, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5. 
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In January 2004, Arar filed a complaint against various U.S. 
officials, including former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
seeking damages and alleging that they had sent him to Syria for the 
purpose of subjecting him to torture and detention there, and had 
indeed conspired with Syrian officials to do so.
35
 For why, asked 
Arar and his lawyers,
36
 would the United States send a man whom it 
suspected of being an al-Qaeda terrorist to Syria, which the United 
States claimed at the time was a state sponsor of terrorism that 
practices torture, and not to Canada, the United States‘ friend and 
ally? The only plausible explanation, Arar and his lawyers posited, 
was that U.S. officials believed that Syria would detain and use 
coercive interrogation methods on Arar to obtain information that the 
FBI had not been able to get, and which they thought Canada could 
not obtain through ordinary police methods. As it turned out, Arar 
had no information to provide. 
Arar argued that since U.S. officials were constitutionally 
forbidden from torturing him in New York, they could not 
intentionally subject him to torture by outsourcing it, namely by 
shipping him to Syria to be tortured there.
37
 Despite Arar‘s strong 
claims on the merits, the district court, a divided Second Circuit 
panel, and a divided en banc Second Circuit decision dismissed 
Arar‘s claims.38 Each decision found, under somewhat different 
reasoning, that Arar had no Bivens‘ claim for damages.39 Perhaps 
most importantly for this discussion, the en banc majority held that 
because the high level government officials were acting based on 
official U.S. policy and were not simply some rogue agents, no claim 
for damages should be allowed since the action really was against the 
U.S. government and not the individual officers.
40
 
Arar also asserted a claim under the TVPA, which the courts 
also dismissed.
41
 The TVPA does not provide for a cause of action 
for torture committed by a U.S. official acting solely under U.S. law; 
Arar claimed that U.S. officials conspired with Syrian officials to 
 
35. Complaint at 2–4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-
04-0249 DGT VVP). 
36. I was one of Arar‘s lawyers. 
37. Complaint, supra note 35, at 10. 
38. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 
(2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
39. Id. 
40. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
41. Id. at 563. 
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have him tortured in Syria.
42
 There was no doubt that, had federal 
courts been able to assert personal jurisdiction over one of the Syrian 
officials involved in Arar‘s torture, the TVPA would have provided a 
private cause of action, because Arar would have been suing a Syrian 
official who had acted under color of Syrian law. The Second Circuit 
held, however, that Arar‘s suit against U.S. officials for a joint 
conspiracy with the Syrians did not state a claim under the TVPA, 
because the statute only provided a cause of action for torture 
committed under color of foreign law, and the U.S. officials were 
acting pursuant to U.S. law, not Syrian law.
43
 The court discounted a 
prior Second Circuit opinion
44
 as well as the decisions of various 
courts of appeals in which federal officials acting in concert with 
state officials in a joint conspiracy were held to have acted under 
color of state law, even though they were acting in their capacity as 
federal officials.
45
 The upshot of the Second Circuit‘s TVPA analysis 
is that a Syrian official who could be found in the United States could 
have been sued for damages, yet a claim could not be asserted against 
the U.S. officials who allegedly conspired with the Syrians. However, 
it makes no sense to allow U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction against 
foreign officials acting in their official capacity on behalf of a foreign 
sovereign—a scenario fraught with potential foreign policy and 
interference with sovereignty concerns—but not officials of the U.S. 
government who are part of a coordinate branch of government 
whose actions are ordinarily subject to review by the federal courts. 
B. Federal Courts’ Dismissal of ATS Torture Claims Against U.S. 
Officials 
The Second Circuit‘s dismissal of Arar‘s claims is not 
exceptional, but the norm. Every other circuit has also dismissed 
actions by citizens and aliens alike for torture claims arising out of 
U.S. officials‘ conduct abroad in the ―war on terror.‖46 For example, 
aliens‘ torture claims brought against U.S. officials pursuant to the 
 
42. Id. at 566. 
43. Id. at 568. 
44. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448 (2d Cir. 1969).  
45. See Hindes v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit cases to support the assertion that ―federal 
officials are subject to section 1983 liability . . . where they have acted under color of state 
law, for example in conspiracy with state officials‖).   
46. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 769 (9th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 
F.3d 193, 205 (7th Cir. 2012); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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ATS have been dismissed as precluded by the Westfall Act, which 
provides that, where the defendant ―was acting within the scope of 
his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the 
claim arose,‖ the United States will be substituted as the defendant.47 
By this provision, the Westfall Act makes the Federal Tort Claims 
Act,
48
 with its broad provisions of immunity for acts committed 
abroad, the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a federal 
official acting within the scope of his employment. Whenever an 
alien sues a federal official under the ATS for torture, the official 
invariably has claimed that his actions were committed within the 
scope of his employment, the U.S. has been substituted as a 
defendant, and the claim has been dismissed.
49
 
Federal courts have rejected the application to U.S. officials of 
the identical argument that plaintiffs successfully made in the ATS 
lawsuits against foreign officials: that official torture is a violation of 
fundamental human rights norms and of criminal law and therefore 
cannot be undertaken by the official within the scope of his official 
governmental duties. As the D.C. Circuit opined: ―While it may 
generally be unexpected that seriously criminal conduct will arise ‗in 
the prosecution of the business,‘ here it was foreseeable that conduct 
that would ordinarily be indisputably ‗seriously criminal‘ [torture] 
would be implemented by military officials responsible for detaining 
and interrogating suspected enemy combatants.‖50 Therefore, such 
torture was within the scope of the military officials‘ employment.51 
Other courts have similarly dismissed ATS claims, rejecting 
arguments that torture in violation of a jus cogens norm cannot be 
considered within the scope of a U.S. official‘s employment.52 
 
 
 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). For a discussion of the impact of the Westfall Act on 
civil human rights litigation, see Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s Work? Scope 
of Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S. 
Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 175 (2008). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
49. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and 
remanded, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing ATCA 
torture claims brought by Iraqi victims of torture at Abu Ghraib because such torture was 
committed within the scope of the officials‘ employment). 
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C. Limiting the Extraterritorial Reach of the Constitution’s 
Proscription of Torture 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has dismissed constitutional claims of 
torture brought by aliens arising out of their detention by military 
officials. Prior to Boumediene v. Bush,
53
 in which the Supreme Court 
held that the Constitution‘s Suspension Clause applied to detainees 
held at Guantánamo Bay,
54
 the D.C. Circuit and district courts in that 
circuit had consistently held that the constitutional proscription of 
cruel and inhumane punishment did not reach U.S. officials who 
tortured aliens abroad.
55
 In Rasul v. Myers,
56
 first decided by the D.C. 
Circuit just prior to the Supreme Court‘s holding in Boumediene, the 
court reiterated that rule in dismissing a Bivens damage action 
brought by former detainees at Guantánamo against high government 
officials for alleged torture they suffered during their detention.
57
 
The Supreme Court vacated the Rasul dismissal after the 
Boumediene decision, ordering the D.C. Circuit to review its decision 
in light of Boumediene.
58
 However, in Kiyemba v. Obama,
59
 the D.C. 
Circuit held that the Court‘s Boumediene decision only involved the 
applicability of the Suspension Clause to Guantánamo and did not 
affect prior circuit law that the Due Process Clause did not apply to 
aliens without property or presence within the United States.
60
 When 
the D.C. Circuit revisited Rasul, it noted that ―the Court in 
Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law 
governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, 
other than the Suspension Clause.‖61 While the court is technically 
correct that Boumediene explicitly addressed only the Suspension 
Clause, Boumediene‘s extended discussion of the Constitution‘s 
extraterritorial reach clearly undermined the D.C. Circuit‘s prior 
holdings that the Constitution simply did not apply to aliens tortured 
 
53. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
54. Id. at 771.  
55. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602–03 (D.C. Cir. 2000); In re Iraq and 
Afghanistan Detainee Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007). 
56. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
57. Id. at 663–65. 
58. Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
59. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated per curiam, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010). 
60. Id. at 1026–27.  
61. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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abroad. The Court‘s review of its prior extraterritorial jurisprudence 
in Boumediene made clear that ―these decisions undermine the 
Government‘s argument that, at least as applied to noncitizens, the 
Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends.‖62 
The D.C. Circuit, however, chose not to rest its decision on the 
ground that the Constitution does not apply to torture of aliens 
abroad, holding instead that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because reasonable officials would not have known that the 
prohibition against torture applies to Guantánamo until at least after 
Boumediene was decided in 2008.
63
 Indeed, the court‘s dicta suggests 
that, even now, it is not clearly established that the constitutional 
proscription against torture applies to Guantánamo or any other U.S. 
military base abroad, and that U.S. officials who engaged in torture 
abroad now would still be entitled to qualified immunity.
64
 
More recently, in Ali v. Rumsfeld,
65
 the D.C. Circuit revisited the 
issue of whether the Constitution protects aliens abroad from torture 
by U.S. officials, this time in the context of claims brought by Iraqi 
citizens allegedly tortured at the Abu Ghraib prison by U.S. 
officials.
66
 As in Rasul v. Myers, the court based its decision 
dismissing plaintiffs‘ claims on qualified immunity grounds.67 The 
D.C. Circuit reiterated the Rasul statement that the Boumediene 
decision was limited to the Suspension Clause and did not apply to 
any other constitutional provision.
68
 However, the court went further 
and noted in dictum that even were the Boumediene functional test to 
apply to a claim of torture, the alleged torture took place in Iraq—at 
the time an ―active theater of war‖—and therefore the Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments would undoubtedly not apply under 
Boumediene.
69
 
In summary, while foreign government officials can be sued in 
the U.S. for officially sanctioned extraterritorial torture (at least until 
now), U.S. government officials generally cannot. A host of doctrines 
 
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008). 
63. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529. 
64. Id. (stating that the D.C. Circuit‘s prior law that the Constitution does not apply to 
U.S. actions against aliens abroad remains undisturbed by the Supreme Court‘s opinion in 
Boumediene, with the exception of the Suspension Clause, which does not apply in some 
circumstances). 
65. 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
66. Id. at 764–65.  
67. Id. 
68. Id.  
69. Id. at 772. 
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preclude any civil accountability for a U.S. official that orders or 
engages in torture abroad. The Westfall Act generally precludes ATS 
liability taken within the scope of official employment;
70
 the TVPA 
has been held not to apply to U.S. officials who are acting under 
color of U.S., not foreign law;
71
 the D.C. Circuit has held that 
constitutional proscriptions do not apply to U.S. official torture of 
aliens abroad and in any event officials who engage in such torture 
are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity;
72
 and as the 
Second Circuit decided in Arar, courts have generally held that no 
private cause of action can be implied under Bivens to give aliens or 
even citizens a claim against U.S. officials for torture committed 
abroad.
73
 
III. JUS COGENS, FUNDAMENTAL NORMS, AND CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
U.S. TORTURE ABROAD    
The basic proposition that stems from the ATS cases until now is 
that foreign officials who commit abuses abroad which violate jus 
cogens human rights norms can be sued in U.S. courts and are not 
entitled to immunity, even if they are acting on behalf of their 
government. The jus cogens analysis applied in these ATS cases 
should be applicable to cases against U.S. officials. Courts should 
utilize the concept of jus cogens human rights violations in analyzing 
lawsuits against U.S. officials for officially sponsored torture 
committed against aliens abroad. The use of jus cogens principles in 
litigation against federal officials, and not simply foreign officials, 
would have several important consequences. First, it would remove 
the inconsistency that has developed in federal courts between the 
treatment of foreign officials and federal officials who torture aliens. 
Second, jus cogens principles should be an important substantive aid 
in determining which constitutional norms should be applicable to 
U.S. officials acting extraterritorially. 
The Supreme Court and other courts have struggled with the 
question of when constitutional norms apply to U.S. government 
 
70. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.  
71. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009). 
72. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ali, 649 F.3d at 764–65. 
73. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568. 
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actions against aliens abroad.
74
 In the Supreme Court‘s latest opinion 
on the issue, Boumediene, the Court articulated a functional test, 
which took a middle position between the view that the Constitution 
simply does not apply to governmental action against aliens abroad, 
and the more cosmopolitan perspective that all of the provisions of 
the Constitution apply wherever and whenever the government acts.
75
 
Based on that test, the Court found that detainees held at Guantánamo 
Bay could seek a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their 
detentions.
76
 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit, as already mentioned, has 
held that the Supreme Court‘s Boumediene decision did not disturb 
prior circuit law which had held that the Constitutional proscriptions 
against torture did not apply to U.S. actions against aliens abroad.
77
 
Importing the ATS jus cogens analysis into the constitutional 
extraterritorial framework would provide clarity, consistency, and 
principled decision-making. An approach to the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution abroad that asked whether the 
constitutional principle at issue reflects a fundamental, non-derogable 
norm of international law preserves governmental flexibility in 
dealing with different cultures, societies, and legal systems, as well as 
the myriad problems that afflict foreign policy, yet also recognizes 
that there are certain types of conduct that are so contrary to the 
fundamental norms of civilized society that the Constitution must 
prohibit the government from engaging in them whenever, wherever, 
and against whomever it acts. The cases the Boumediene Court relied 
on—United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,78 Johnson v. Eisentrager,79 
the Insular Cases, and the opinions by Justice Harlan and Justice 
Frankfurter in Reid v. Covert
80—are all premised on the proposition 
that when the government acts abroad, there may be circumstances 
when it acts in the context of a different legal regime that permits a 
practice that the Constitution would prohibit were the actions to occur 
here. In Verdugo, Mexican law did not require a search warrant;
81
 in 
Eisentrager, military law and the international law of war permitted 
 
74. See Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law and the Extraterritorial 
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT‘L L. 307, 324–34 (2011).  
75. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764–67 (2008). For a discussion of Justice 
Kennedy‘s functional compromise, see Lobel, supra note 74, at 316–18. 
76. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795. 
77. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
78. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
79. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
80. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
81. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S at 262–63. 
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trial of war crimes committed by enemy combatants by military 
tribunal;
82
 in the Insular Cases, the law of newly acquired territories 
did not provide for jury trials; in Reid, an agreement between Great 
Britain and the United States permitted trial by U.S. court-martial of 
defendants who committed crimes in Great Britain while 
accompanying members of the armed forces overseas.
83
  
Unlike the rights at issue in those cases, there are some rights, 
such as the right to be free of torture, genocide, or slavery, that are 
treated as fundamental and never derogable by the international 
community as a whole. While nations obviously do engage in torture, 
genocide, and slavery, no country asserts the legal authority to do so, 
and laws of other nations prohibit such practices. The cultural and 
legal diversity rationale partially underlying the Boumediene 
functional test is thus inapplicable to such non-derogable universal 
norms. 
Moreover, the international community, including the U.S. 
government, has not merely accepted these rights as fundamental, but 
has agreed that it is never ―practicable‖ to engage in such conduct as, 
for example, torture, summary execution, or genocide, irrespective of 
whatever ―realistic‖ or ―practical‖ foreign policy arguments are made 
to support such actions. To use fundamental international law norms 
to inform the Constitution‘s reach would thus both provide a limiting 
normative principle and also meet the practical concerns that the 
Court focused on in Boumediene. 
Finally, jus cogens norms should inform the application of such 
doctrines as qualified immunity and Westfall Act substitution of the 
United States as a defendant for purposes of the ATS. That a norm is 
considered so fundamental to the international community that all 
nations, including the United States, consider it to be non-derogable 
even in wartime or national emergencies suggests that any official 
ought to know that it is impermissible to engage in such activity, 
even if the government authorizes it. Officials who commit war 
crimes, genocide, slavery, or torture should not be accorded qualified 
immunity, even where higher officials authorized their actions. So 
too, the D.C. Circuit is simply wrong that such criminal actions can 
be considered to be within the scope of official employment. These 
 
82. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 786. 
83. Reid, 354 U.S. at 15. 
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fundamental human rights principles should inform domestic 
immunity doctrines, just as they have been utilized by the courts in 
the ATS context. 
IV. POSTSCRIPT: THE KIOBEL DECISION  
This Essay was written prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
84
 That decision held that ―the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the 
ATS.‖85 One could thus view the Kiobel decision as lessening the 
tension and contradiction set forth in this Essay by removing U.S 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against foreign government officials 
who commit serious human rights abuses against aliens 
extraterritorially, just as the federal courts have accorded immunity to 
U.S. officials who commit such abuses. 
Yet the Kiobel decision does not resolve the tension set forth 
here for several reasons. First, as Justice Kennedy noted in his 
concurrence, the TVPA explicitly provides a cause of action for 
aliens and citizens to sue foreign governmental officials who commit 
certain serious human rights abuses abroad.
86
 Nonetheless, the courts 
have held that the TVPA does not allow aliens or citizens to sue U.S. 
officials who commit those same abuses abroad—even when they are 
acting in concert with foreign governmental officials who could be 
held liable. Thus, the contradiction that a federal action can be 
maintained against foreign state torturers, but not U.S. official 
torturers, for their conduct abroad, survives Kiobel. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, while the Kiobel 
majority significantly narrowed the use of ATS jurisdiction to sue 
human rights abusers for extraterritorial violations, it did not close 
the courthouse door completely. As Justice Kennedy‘s critical and 
vague concurrence recognizes, the majority opinion left open ―a 
number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation 
of the Alien Tort Statute.‖87 Most importantly, the majority implicitly 
recognized that at least some abuses committed against aliens abroad 
would be actionable in U.S. courts when it stated that ―even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
 
84. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).   
85. Id. at 1669.   
86. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
87. Id.  
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extraterritorial application.‖88 This strongly suggests that there might 
be some claims which arise from conduct abroad, and therefore 
would normally be subject to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, but which nonetheless ―touch and concern‖ U.S. 
territory with sufficient strength to displace the presumption. The 
Court is silent on what those types of claims might be. Similarly, 
while the majority opinion holds that ―mere corporate presence‖ in 
the United States does not suffice for the extraterritorial application 
of ATS jurisdiction,
89
 it does not address whether an U.S. corporation 
can be held accountable pursuant to ATS jurisdiction for acts 
occurring abroad which are planned in the United States. 
 Yet if U.S. corporations can be sued for at least some human 
rights violations occurring abroad—and that question is not yet 
answered—then why should U.S. officials who commit the same 
violations be accorded immunity? Absolute immunity from ATS 
jurisdiction for U.S. officials is still inconsistent with the Court‘s 
allowing at least some ATS cases to go forward. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy‘s brief concurrence, when combined 
with Justice Breyer‘s concurrence on behalf of four justices who 
disagreed with the majority‘s reasoning, suggests that in some cases 
foreign officials could be held liable under ATS jurisdiction for acts 
occurring abroad. Kennedy obscurely noted that cases ―may arise 
with allegations of serious violations of international law principles 
protecting persons‖ which are not covered by either the TVPA or the 
―reasoning and holding of today‘s case,‖ in which the ―proper 
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application 
may require some further elaboration and explanation.‖90 As one 
commentator has noted, Justice Kennedy‘s concerns at oral argument 
with preserving Filártiga and cases like it may be behind this vague 
concurrence.
91
 
In addition, Justice Breyer‘s concurrence on behalf of himself 
and three other Justices would uphold ATS jurisdiction where, inter 
alia, the alleged torturer or human rights abuser has relocated to the 
United States and seeks a ―safe harbor‖ from civil and criminal 
 
88. Id. (majority opinion).  
89. Id. 
90. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
91. Anton Metlitsky, Commentary: What’s left of the Alien Tort Statute?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=162581. 
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liability here.
92
 Breyer explicitly refers to Filártiga and the Marcos 
litigation as instances in which the courts of appeals properly found 
jurisdiction where an alleged human rights abuser had fled to or 
relocated in the territory of the United States.
93
 It is plausible that 
faced with a case involving a foreign government official accused of 
a serious human rights abuse (that is not torture or summary 
execution and thus not covered by the TVPA), who has fled his home 
country and is living in the United States, at least Justice Kennedy 
and the four Breyer concurrers would hold that ATS jurisdiction lies. 
Leaving this possibility open, as Justice Kennedy and the 
majority seem to do, raises anew the tension at the core of this Essay. 
Why should foreign governmental officials who commit human 
rights abuses abroad and have fled their home countries and are 
living in the United States be subject to federal court jurisdiction to 
hold them civilly accountable for their violations, while U.S. 
officials, who engage in the identical abuse be accorded a safe haven 
here? Federal courts ought to have a stronger claim to assert 
jurisdiction against the latter than the former. Kiobel, then, far from 
resolving the contradiction presented here, seems to continue it, albeit 
in a much more muted form. 
 
92. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
93. Id. at 1675. 
